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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Louis Neptune appeals from an order rejecting his second amended complaint, as 
well as the denial of his requests for reconsideration of that order and the denial of his 
motion for a change of venue.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.   
 Neptune filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF 1), which he 
amended twice.  (ECF 16, 34).  The District Court refused to accept the second amended 
complaint, explaining that it was “subject to dismissal based on judicial/prosecutorial 
immunity; failure to sufficiently allege lack of probable cause for a malicious prosecution 
claim; or … otherwise frivolous.”1  (ECF 45, at 2 n.1.)  Neptune repeatedly moved for 
reconsideration (ECF 50, 51, and 56), and filed a “Motion for Change of Venue.”  (ECF 
60).  On September 21, 2020, the District Court denied Neptune’s requests for 
reconsideration, as well as his motion for a change of venue.  (ECF 66 & 67.)  Neptune 
appealed.  (ECF 68.)   
 
1 The District Court also held that Neptune had failed to timely comply with its orders 
concerning the filing of an amended complaint and failed to provide sufficient reasons for 
his noncompliance.  (ECF 45 & 46.)  We need not consider whether the District Court 
should have engaged in the multi-factor balancing under Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), before rejecting Neptune’s second amended complaint, 
see Hamer v. Livanova Deutschland GMBH, 994 F.3d 173, 180 n.25 (3d Cir. 2021) 
(holding that the “District Court was required to undertake at least some consideration of 
the Poulis factors before dismissing [plaintiff’s] claims” for failure to comply with a 
court order), because we conclude that remanding this matter to the District Court for 
consideration of the Poulis factors would be futile.  In particular, as explained below, 
Neptune’s second amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 




We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  When, as here, a plaintiff 
proceeds in forma pauperis, a court may dismiss claims sua sponte if they fail to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted and amendment would be inequitable or futile.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 
(3d Cir. 2002).  We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  See Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  
In his second amended complaint, Neptune alleged, in relevant part, that his 
constitutional rights were violated by Superior Court Judge Marcia Silva, the Middlesex 
County Prosecutor’s Office (MCPO), and prosecutor Andrew Carey.  In particular, he 
claimed that those defendants participated in a conspiracy that involved, among other 
things, falsely charging him with forgery, “plant[ing]” an “altered document in [his] FD 
file,” and “us[ing] [his] social security number to set up a fake mugshot with a felony 
conviction.”  (ECF 34, at ¶ 58.)  According to Neptune, the defendants used the mugshot 
to get a wiretap warrant.  (Id.)  Neptune further claimed that Judge Silva used his “arrest 
to prevent [him] from com[ing] to family court to award me custody of my son” (id. at ¶ 
14), and “then sent [his] custody file to Georgia to hide her crimes.”  (Id. at ¶ 15.)   
The District Court properly held that Neptune’s second amended complaint failed 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the claims against Judge Silva 
 
2 Because Neptune’s first request for reconsideration was timely, we have jurisdiction 
over both the order rejecting his second amended complaint and the denial of his requests 
for reconsideration.  See Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273, 275 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(holding that the time for taking an appeal is tolled during the pendency of a timely post-
judgment motion); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).   
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and Carey were barred by immunity.  “A judicial officer in the performance of his duties 
has absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.”  Azubuko v. 
Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006).  Similarly, prosecutors are generally immune 
from liability for damages in actions brought pursuant to § 1983.3  See Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).  Neptune’s claims against Judge Silva and Carey 
principally focused on actions that they took in their judicial and prosecutorial capacities.  
See Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 
(holding that judicial immunity extends to judicial officers, even if their actions were ‘“in 
error, w[ere] done maliciously, or w[ere] in excess of [their] authority,’” unless the 
officers acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction (quoting Azubuko, 443 F.3d at 303)).  
To the extent, if any, that Neptune alleged that Judge Silva acted in the absence of all 
jurisdiction or that Carey’s actions were not “intimately associated with the judicial phase 
of the criminal process,” Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 159-61 (3d Cir. 2020), Neptune’s 
claims were vague and conclusory.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  
Further amendment of Neptune’s complaint would be futile.  See Grayson, 293 F.3d at 
114.  
 
3 Neptune’s claims against Carey are generally coextensive with his claims against the 
MCPO.  But, to the extent that Neptune’s claims against the MCPO are based on training 
and policy decisions which required legal knowledge and discretion, the MCPO is 





In addition, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Neptune’s 
motions for reconsideration.  See Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 
(3d Cir. 1999).  In substantial part, those motions challenged the District Court’s rejection 
of his second amended complaint on the ground that he repeatedly missed filing 
deadlines.  We need not consider those challenges, however, because we are affirming on 
the alternative basis that Neptune failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  
See note 1, supra.  With respect to the District Court’s assessment of the merits, Neptune 
did not set forth grounds for reconsideration, such as an intervening change in controlling 
law, new evidence, or a need to correct a clear error of fact or law or prevent manifest 
injustice.  See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Finally, we conclude that the District Court’s dismissal of Neptune’s motion to 
change venue was not an abuse of discretion.  In that motion, Neptune, who alleged that 
the District Court’s “previous ruling was clearly unfair,” claimed that he “will not get a 
fair opportunity to be heard if this claim remains in NJ.”  (ECF 60, at 1.)  A District Court 
may transfer a civil action to another district in which the case could have been brought 
or to which the parties have consented “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses” 
and “in the interest of justice.”  28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also Reading Health Sys. v. 
Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 96 n.37 (3d Cir. 2018).  Neptune did not describe any 
inconvenience from litigation in the District of New Jersey, adequately explain why 
transfer would be in the interest of justice, or identify another district where the action 
might have been brought.  See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960) (stating 
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that “the power of a District Court under § 1404(a) to transfer an action to another district 
is made to depend … upon whether the transferee district was one in which the action 
‘might have been brought’ by the plaintiff”).  Consequently, the District Court properly 
denied Neptune’s motion to change venue.4  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.5    
 
4 To the extent that Neptune alleged that the District Court Judge was biased, Neptune 
failed to show that a reasonable observer would conclude that the Judge’s impartiality 
could reasonably be questioned.  See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d 
Cir. 2004).   
 
5 Neptune’s motion for oral argument and his motion to strike the appellees’ brief are 
denied. 
